Do Targeted Hiring Subsidies and Profiling Techniques Reduce Unemployment? by Jahn, Elke J. & Wagner, Thomas
IZA DP No. 3768




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
October 2008 
Do Targeted Hiring Subsidies and 




Elke J. Jahn 
Aarhus School of Business, IAB and IZA  
 
Thomas Wagner 











P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











Do Targeted Hiring Subsidies and Profiling Techniques 
Reduce Unemployment? 
 
To reduce unemployment targeted hiring subsidies for long-term unemployed are often 
recommended. To explore their effect on employment and wages, we devise a model with 
two types of unemployed and two methods of search, a public employment service (PES) 
and random search. The eligibility of a new match depends on the applicant’s unemployment 
duration and on the method of search. The hiring subsidy raises job destruction and extends 
contrary to Mortensen-Pissarides (1999, 2003) the duration of a job search, so that 
equilibrium unemployment increases. Like the subsidy, organizational reforms, which 
advance the search effectiveness of the PES, crowd out the active jobseekers and reduce 
overall employment as well as social welfare. Nevertheless, reforms are a visible success for 
the PES and its target group, as they significantly increase the service’s placement rate and 
lower the duration of a job search via the PES. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
To fight unemployment, instruments of active labour market policy (ALMP) have been in use 
for many years in Europe. The quest for such policy measures continues to be central to the pol-
icy debate, particularly in the large European countries with persistently high unemployment. To 
reduce intervention costs and deadweight losses, ALMP instruments target on special groups of 
unemployed, particularly on the long-term unemployed. In addition, it is often recommended, for 
instance in the European Employment Strategy (European Commission 2006) or in the German 
“Hartz Proposals” (Hartz et al. 2002), that the public employment service (PES) increases its 
search effectiveness. A wide variety of tools have been proposed to achieve this objective. The 
implicit assumption behind all PES reforms is that coordination failures hamper the labour mar-
ket, which can be overcome by ALMP and a comprehensive search assistance by the PES. 
To analyze the effects of targeted hiring subsidies and enhancement strategies, we use a 
search model of the Mortensen-Pissarides type with an endogenous separation rate which 
combines two methods of search, the PES and random search. Workers are employed or un-
employed, and if unemployed they are either short-term, medium-term or long-term unem-
ployed. Firms must retrain entrants and pay the training costs. If eligible, they receive a job 
creation assistance. Eligibility depends on the worker status and the method of search. Two 
subsidy regimes are compared. In the first regime, only placements by the PES are eligible, in 
the second also matches established by random search take part in the subsidy competition. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops the 
model. Section 4 presents simulation results. Section 5 concludes. The Appendices I-II con-
tain a summary of the model equations and definitions of some indicator functions, which are 
used in order to evaluate the simulation outcomes.
1  
2 LITERATURE 
There is a growing empirical literature estimating the short-term employment effects for the 
participants of ALMP programmes. Even if the net effects of hiring subsidies and profiling 
                                                 
1   Proofs can be found in Appendix III which is available upon request.  
measures are positive, the effect on the aggregate rate of unemployment remains inconclusive 
(Heckman et al. 1999, Kluve 2006). One reason may be that there are interactions between 
ALMP participants and other employed or unemployed jobseekers, specifically crowding out 
and general equilibrium effects. Without incorporating them into a macro framework, the mi-
croeconometric treatment effects will provide poor guides to policy makers.  
Matching models are a powerful instrument to analyze the macroeconomic impact of 
ALMP. The theoretical literature of the effect of hiring subsidies and instruments which in-
crease the efficiency of the PES on the aggregate rate of unemployment is still in its infancy 
and relatively small (Yashiv 2006 and Rogerson et al. 2005). Moreover, to our knowledge, the 
literature has paid little attention to the effects of instruments that target on particular groups 
of the unemployed. Furthermore, this strand of the literature does not take into account that 
ALMP can influence the matching process itself (Brown et al. 2006, 4f). It is the objective of 
our paper to address these questions. 
Millard and Mortensen (1997), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999, 2003) and Pissarides 
(2000, ch. 9) analyze the effects of non-targeted hiring subsidies on equilibrium unemploy-
ment. The labour market is characterized by a matching technology which represents the two-
sided search process with its frictions arising from imperfect information, mobility costs and 
worker and job heterogeneities. Each new match of a jobseeker with a vacancy is eligible for 
a hiring subsidy. The hiring subsidy increases both the number of vacancies and the amount 
of job destruction. Therefore, its overall effect on equilibrium unemployment is ambiguous. 
Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999, 2003) thus simulate the 
net effects of the subsidy and show that the hiring subsidy increases the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate. 
Yashiv (2004) addresses the question whether hiring subsidies, employment subsidies, un-
employment benefits and wage tax reductions under a given budget constraint have substan-
tial effects on labour market outcomes and the business cycle when labour market frictions 
are present. Within a stochastic, discrete-time version of a matching model, he shows that hir-
ing subsidies reduce unemployment while employment subsidies and wage tax cuts do not.  
The positive effect of the hiring subsidy is partly induced as Yashiv (2006, 276) states by the 
setup of a model that does not allow for endogenous separations. 
Brown et al. (2006) introduce self-financing hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term un-
employed and unskilled workers into a dynamic model setting. Their calibrated model shows 
that in contrast to wage subsidies hiring vouchers can raise employment, are “approximately 
welfare efficient” and reduce inequality. The model setup determines that entrants or outsiders 
earn a wage that is negotiated between the insiders and the firm. The hiring voucher does 
therefore not influence the outsider wage and the initial labour costs of the firm, which pock-
ets the entire subsidy. While the entrant’s hiring rate increases with the cash inflow from the 
voucher, the insider’s firing rate is unaffected.  
Within a general equilibrium search model Vereshchagina (2002) evaluates the long-run 
implications of shifting unemployment benefits into a subsidy programme targeting the long-
term unemployed. In general, the effect of the subsidy is ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
introduction of a subsidy reduces government's expenditure on unemployment benefits and 
weakens the distortionary effects of the unemployment insurance system by putting the un-
employed back to work. On the other hand, the subsidy programme puts additional economic 
pressure on the government budget caused by the subsidy. The higher the elasticity of labour 
demand, the more likely it is that the subsidy programme generates a government budget sur-
plus and positively affects welfare.  
Our discrete-time model differs from the above-mentioned in the following respects. First, 
two competing search methods are available, the PES and random search (Pissarides 1979). 
Second, the unemployed choose between a passive and an active search strategy. Third, we 
distinguish between two types of unemployed namely the short-term unemployed (STU) and 
the medium-term and long-term unemployed (MLTU). In view of the response time which the 
PES needs to make a first job offer to a newly registered unemployed, STU workers can count 
on no search assistance from the PES.  
Fourth, the matching process comprises three stages. In the last stage, the PES matches the 
stock of registered vacancies with the stock of registered MLTU workers. In the second stage, 
the stock of active MLTU workers randomly searches for a vacancy. In the first stage, the  
active jobseekers among the inflow of STU workers is matched with the stock of vacancies. 
Thus, the model combines stock-flow with random matching. 
Fifth, most of the above-mentioned models assume an exogenous job destruction rate. In 
these models, ALMP primarily affects job creation rather than job destruction which seems 
counter-factual. We build on the theoretical matching literature by adding an endogenous job 
destruction rate (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, 1999, 2003).  
Sixth, we investigate two instruments of active labour market policy, organizational re-
forms to advance the placement effectiveness of the PES and a hiring subsidy. In most of the 
above-mentioned papers, the subsidy is a lump-sump payment, which creates a pure quasi-
rent. In Mortensen and Pissarides (1999, 2003), the subsidy offsets a fixed job creation cost 
of the employers. In the present paper, firms bearing stochastic training costs to reintegrate 
the MLTU workers into production compete for the subsidy. Training costs are compensated 
up to an endogenous subsidy limit. We compare two subsidy regimes. In the first, only 
matches with a MLTU worker arranged by the PES are eligible. In the second, also matches 
established through random search compete for the hiring subsidy.  
The calibrated version of the model generates the following results. Both instruments of 
ALMP increase equilibrium unemployment. They induce both a fundamental change of the 
equilibrium composition of search methods, boosting passive and curbing active job search. 
They raise the equilibrium fraction of MLTU workers and the duration of unemployment, and 
reduce social welfare. Both instruments are a visible and significant success for the PES and 
its target group. For example, reforms to advance the search effectiveness of the PES boost 
the service’s placement rate and reduce the average duration of a job search via the PES. Ac-
tive policy approaches like the “Hartz-reforms” recommend increasing the productivity of the 
PES in order to overcome the coordination failures of the labour market. This popular ceteris 
paribus reasoning is not confirmed by our simulation results.  
3 THE MODEL 
3.1 EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT  
A discrete-time model is devised with two methods of search, random search and organized 
search by a PES, and two types of unemployed. The first type is the STU workers who have 
lost their job at the end of the previous period. The second type has been unemployed for at 
least one period and is either medium-term or long-term unemployed (MLTU). Jobseekers 
choose between an active and a passive search strategy. Active jobseekers use both methods 
of search; passive jobseekers wait for a placement by the PES. The search strategy of the va-
cancies is not specialized; they are simultaneously advertised and registered with the PES.  
Matching process. The timing of the matching process is as follows (Figure 1). In the first 
stage, the inflow of active STU workers meet the advertised vacancies. Active STU have the 
best information about current labour market conditions and apply earlier than the PES or the 
active MLTU. In the second stage, vacancies are matched with the active MLTU. In the last 
stage, the PES arranges matches between the registered vacancies and the registered unem-
ployed. The meetings of the first and second stage are not observed by the PES, so a fraction 
of the PES matches do not fit. This can happen either because the selected vacancies are al-
ready occupied or the selected jobseekers have already found a job. 
Training costs. Each match with a MLTU worker causes match-specific training costs 
0 ≥ t , of which ex ante only the c.d.f.  ) (t F  with support  ∞ < ≤t 0  and the endogenous reser-
vation costs  i T  are known. Reservation costs depend on the search method  S P i , = .  P T  are 
the training costs up to which vacancies are ready to take on applicants placed by the PES.  S T  
are the reservation costs of the method of random search. A match, which is arranged through 
the search method i, is dissolved, if firm and worker draw training costs  i T t > .  
Separation rate. The labour force is normalised to one. Job creation takes place at the be-
ginning and job destruction at the end of a period. Of the  u − 1  employed,  ≡ I () ( ) u R G − 1 λ  
lose their job at the end of a period.  ) (R G λ  is the unemployment incidence where λ is the 
probability of an idiosyncratic productivity shock,  ( ) x G  with support  1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ x α  is the 
c.d.f. of the multiplicative shock x and R is the endogenous reservation productivity.  yx , with  
0 > y , is the flow output of a job. If a firm draws x and  1 ≤ ≤ x R , the job is continued. If 
R x < , the match is dissolved, and the worker becomes unemployed. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Transition probabilities. Of the inflow of I STU workers,  I S  opt for active job search. As 
the STU are at least as productive as the MLTU and do not cause training costs, it does not 
pay for a vacancy to wait for the subsequent stages of the matching process. Therefore, 
() v S m I ,  of the v advertised vacancies are filled by the active STU. The matching technology 
() v s m ,  of the method of random search has constant returns to scale and is strictly concave 
and monotone in both arguments. For a given vacancy, the probability of a match with a STU 
worker is  () ≡ I q θ () = 1 , 1 I m θ () v v S m I , , where  I I S v = θ  is the stock-flow tightness of the 
labour market in the first stage. For convenience, we write  ( ) I I q q θ =  and  ( )= ≡ I I p p θ  
() I Iq θ θ . In the steady state  I p , the transition probability of an active STU worker, is equal 
to the proportion of newly unemployed jobseekers who match immediately after separation 
(Forslund and Johansson 2007). 
The other  0 ≥ − I S I  workers of the inflow wait for a placement through the PES. Passive 
STU cannot expect a job offer until the second period of the unemployment spell. The reason 
for this delay is the response time of the PES, which is the time the agency needs to process the 
worker’s data and to prepare a first job offer. The German Federal Employment Office esti-
mates an average response time of three months for 2005. We assume that the response time of 
the PES lasts one period plus the duration of a job search. One period is equal to a quarter of a 
year in the calibrated model version. 
The number of STU, who either do not find a job or prefer to wait for the PES,  S u , is given 
by: 
S I I u S p I = − .       (1) 
S u  is the inflow into the pool u of MLTU workers, of which S opt for random search. They 
face the same v advertised vacancies of which  v qI  are already occupied with active STU. 
) , ( v S m  represents the measure of contacts, and  ( ) ( )= ≡ 1 , / 1 S S m q θ θ ( ) v v S m ,  is the contact 
probability of a given vacancy with an active MLTU jobseeker, where  S v S = θ  is the tight- 
ness of the labour market in the second stage. The contact probability for a given jobseeker is 
() () S S S q p θ θ θ = , where we write  ( ) S S q q θ =  and  = S p ( ) S p θ . Of the S active MLTU 
() S T F p S +  draw training costs  S T t ≤  and make a transition into employment, where 
= + p () I S q p − 1.   
The pool  () S T F p u S + −  consists of MLTU workers who either prefer to wait for the PES 
or who have decided for active job search but did not find a job or even hit on a vacancy but 
the job was already filled or the vacancy was still available but the match would have caused 
too high training costs. These workers have a last chance to be placed by the PES. The prob-
ability of a suitable placement arranged by the PES is  ( ) P T F P+ , where  = + P () () S I q q P − − 1 1.  
P is the probability of a contact with a vacancy found by the PES and () () S I q q − − 1 1  is the 
probability that the vacancy is not yet filled by any of the active jobseekers.  
The contact probability P is the output of the placement activities of the PES. For given 
search effort ef,  () v u ef , , M  is the measure of arranged contacts between the v registered va-
cancies and the u registered unemployed, where  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ ef . The production function of the 
PES is multiplicative separable with respect to ef, so that  ( )= v u ef , , M ()( ) v u M ef , μ . The ef-
fort function  () ef μ , with  () 0 0 = μ , is strictly increasing and exhibits diminishing returns. The 
matching function of the PES,  () v u M , , has standard properties.  ( )≡ Θ , ef Q ()( ) = 1 , / 1 Θ μ M ef  
()( ) v v u M ef , μ  is the contact probability of a given vacancy with a worker via the PES with 
u v = Θ  denoting the tightness between both registers, and  ( )= Θ , ef P ) , ( Θ Θ ef Q  is the con-
tact probability of a given worker with a registered vacancy. We write  () Θ , ef P P =  and 
() Θ , ef Q Q = . 
Considering the flows out of the pool u and taking into account the inflow  S u  into u yields 
the steady state condition: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] S T F p u T F P S T F p u S P S S + + + − + = .     (2) 
 
LEMMA 1 [UNEMPLOYMENT]. (i)  If a newly unemployed worker opts for a placement 
through the PES, he will be out of work for  P D  periods. In view of the response time of the 
PES,  P D  is given by  P P d D + =1 , where  = P d ( ) P T F P+ 1 .  
(ii)  An unemployed who combines the passive search strategy in the first period of his un-
employment spell with the active search strategy in all subsequent periods faces a duration of  
unemployment of  S S d D + =1  periods, where  ( )( ) [ ] () [ ] P S S S T F P T F p T F p d + + + − + = 1 1  is 
the expected duration of job search of an active MLTU worker. Obviously,  P S D D < .  
(iii)  A newly unemployed worker who opts for the active search strategy can expect a spell 
length of  () S I I I D p p D − + = 1 5 . 0  periods, where we assume to overcome time aggregation 
problems that the workers who immediately after separation find a new job face a duration of 
unemployment equal to half a period. 
(iv)  With the share of active MLTU  1 ≤ = u S S σ  and the ratio of active jobseekers among 
the STU  u SI I = σ , the steady-state equilibrium stock of unemployed u is  
( )
() ( ) P S S S I I d d p R G
R G
u
/ 1 / σ σ σ λ
λ
− + + +
= .      (3) 
(v)  Let  I SI = , so that all newly unemployed workers actively search. Then the expected 
duration of a job search D of a worker who is randomly drawn from the inflow I is given by 
() ( ) [ ] P S S S I I D D p p D σ σ − + − + = 1 1 5 . 0 .      (4) 
Hiring subsidy. The government assigns to the PES an exogenous subsidy budget B which 
pays a job-specific creation assistance  0 ≥ η  to firms that employ a MLTU worker. η is dis-
bursed as soon as the training costs  0 ≥ t  are observed, where due to the subsidy limit H: 
{} H t, min = η . Matches with training costs  0 > − H t  have to finance the balance out of the 
match rent. 
There are two subsidy regimes  { } 1 , 0 ∈ τ . If only matches arranged by the PES are subsi-
dized,  0 = τ . Otherwise, if all matches with a MLTU worker are eligible,  1 = τ . The PES sets 
H, the endogenous subsidy limit, such that for given B the following budget constraint is ful-
filled: 
() [] () ( ) ( ) []
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The first summand on the right hand side is the subsidy demand of the matches arranged by 
the PES, the second summand is the demand of the matches established through random 
search, which are entitled only in the regime  1 = τ . The overall subsidy demand is a continu-
ous and strictly increasing function of the subsidy limit per eligible job H and equal to zero if 
0 = H . Thus, for all  0 ≥ B  a unique subsidy limit  0 ≥ H  exists, such that the budget con-
straint (5) is fulfilled.  
3.2 FILLED JOBS AND EMPLOYED WORKERS 
An employment contract  () ( ) [] R x w t wi , ,  includes the outside wage  () t wi , the inside wage 
() x w , and the reservation productivity R at which the firm will destroy the job. Wages are 
paid at the end of a period. The initial wage depends on the training costs and on the job-
seeker type, where  I i =  if the applicant is a STU worker, and  S P i , =  if the applicant is 
placed by the PES or is an active MLTU jobseeker, respectively.  
Continuation period. Let  () x Π  be the present value of a filled job with idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity  [] 1 , α ∈ x . The steady state asset price equation for  ( ) x Π  is 
() () () () ( ) ()
⎭ ⎬ ⎫
⎩ ⎨ ⎧ − + + − = ∫
1
1
R x h dG h x w yx x Π λ Π λ ρ Π .     (6) 
Flow and stock variables are discounted at the rate ρ , where  1 ) 1 ( 1 0 < + = < r ρ  with the 
real interest rate  0 > r . With probability λ  the job is hit by a shock and the new productivity 
is h. If  1 ≤ ≤ h R , the job is continued and its value is  ( ) h Π  otherwise, if  R h <  the job is de-
stroyed, where R is the reservation productivity for which  ( ) 0 = R Π .  
The present value of the worker  ( ) x W  is  






⎧ − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + = ∫ x W U R G h dG h W x w x W
R I λ λ ρ 1
1
.   (7) 
If a shock  R h ≥  occurs, the value of the worker is  ( ) h W . If  R h <  the job is destroyed, the 
worker becomes a STU jobseeker and his value is  I U . 
Training period. To re-integrate the MLTU workers into the production, firms must spend 
training costs t.
2 The outside wage  ( ) t wP  and the initial value of the job  () t P Π  as well as the 
initial value of the worker  () t WP  depend on t if t exceeds the subsidy limit H. The present 
value before training costs t and subsidy payments  { } H t, min = η  of a job filled with a MLTU 
worker who is placed by the PES is given by 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) () {} ∫ − + + − =
1
1 1
R P P h dG h t w y t Π λ Π λ ρ Π ,     (8) 
                                                 
2   The asset equations for a match with a STU worker can be found in the Appendix III, see equations (B3), 
(B4).  
while the present value of the worker during the training period is 






⎧ − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + = ∫ 1 1
1
W U R G h dG h W t w t W
R I P P λ λ ρ .     (9) 
If no shock arrives, the match enters the continuation period with productivity  1 = x , and 
job and worker take on the values  ( ) 1 Π  and  ( ) 1 W  respectively. 
3.3 JOB CREATION 
Market entry for vacancies is free but feasible only in the first of the three subsequent stages 
of the matching process. Due to the perfectly elastic supply in the first stage, the asset value 
of vacancies is driven to zero and the job creation condition is  + + − = I I q k Π 0 () I I V q − 1 , 
where k is the flow recruiting cost,  I q  is the probability of a match with a STU worker,  I Π  
is the initial job value, and  I V  is the value of a vacancy’s outside option. 
Three factors are responsible for  0 ≥ I V . First, the search strategy of a vacancy is not spe-
cialised, all vacancies are registered and advertised. Second, a vacancy that is not filled during 
the first stage has the option to meet a jobseeker in the second or third stage of the matching 
process. Third, the supply of vacancies is perfectly inelastic in the last two stages, such that in 
equilibrium  0 ≥ I V , where  I V  is given by 
( ) P S S S I V Q q V q V + − + = 1 .        (10) 
S q  is the probability that the vacancy will meet an active MLTU worker, and  S V  is the 
value of the vacancy in the second stage. If the vacancy does not meet an active MLTU, then 
it still has the chance to contact a worker placed by the PES. The probability of a suitable 
match with a worker placed by the PES is  = + Q ( ) [ ] S S T F p Q σ + − 1 , where Q is the contact 
probability and  () [] S S T F p σ + − 1  is the probability that the worker is still available and the 
training costs are feasible. The probability that the PES arranges a match with a registered 
worker who already found a job in the preceding stage is  ( ) S S T F p σ + , where  u S S = σ  is the 
share of active MLTU workers. Finally,  P V  is the value of the vacancy in the final stage. 
Outside options. Firms know the c.d.f. of the training costs  ( ) t F , the reservation costs  i T , 
S P i , = , and the subsidy limit H, which is announced by the PES. Before the training costs 
are revealed, the value of a vacancy which is in contact with a worker placed by the PES is  
() ( ) [] () ∫ − + + =
P T
H P P P t dF t H t H F V Π Π .      (11) 
If the training costs are fully refunded, an event with probability  ( ) H F , the job has the ini-
tial value  P Π . The integral expression in (11) denotes the value of the job if the training costs 
are not fully refunded but are below  P T . If the training costs exceed  P T , the match dissolves. 
Before the training costs are known, the conditional option value of a vacancy that meets an 
active jobseeker among the MLTU in the second stage of the matching process is 
() ( ) [] () [] P S
T
H S S S V Q T F t dF t H t H F V
S
+ − + − + + = ∫ 1 ) (
τ τ Π Π τ .     (12) 
If the training costs exceed  S T , the match is dissolved and, in view of the third stage, the 
vacancy takes on the expected value of its outside option  P V Q+ .  
Reservation costs. The hiring subsidy refunds the training costs up to the subsidy limit H. 
The allocation of the remaining costs is part of the contract negotiation, and the value of a job, 
which is filled with a worker who was placed by the PES,  ( ) t P Π , depends on t. As will be 
shown in Lemma 3,  () t P Π  is an increasing function of t, while the net value of the job, 
() t H t P − + Π , is a contraction and fulfils the reservation property with respect to t. Hence, 
reservation costs  P T  exist for which 
( ) H T T P P P + = Π .       (13) 
A job which meets an active MLTU worker will only be filled if its net value exceeds the 
value of the outside option  P V Q+ , such that  ( ) ≥ − + t H t S τ Π P V Q+ . Thus, the reservation 
training costs  S T  of the method of random search are given by: 
( ) P S S S V Q H T T + − + = τ Π .        (14) 
3.4 JOBSEEKERS AND WAGES 
Search strategy. Given the unemployment benefit b, STU workers opt for the search strategy 
which maximises their value  I U  
() ( ) ( ) {} U b p W p c U b U I I I I I + − + + − + = ρ ρ 1 , max .     (15)  
The Bellman equation (15) represents the choice set of the STU workers. A worker who 
prefers search via the PES receives at the end of the period the unemployment benefit b and 
takes on the value U. In case the worker opts for random search, he would have to bear search 
costs  0 > I c . With probability  I p , he will locate a vacancy, and his value is  I W . With prob-
ability  I p − 1 , his search fails. 
In order to determine U, note that at the beginning of the subsequent period the worker is 
still unemployed and has to decide whether to wait for a placement by the PES or to search 
actively. In the first case, his value is  P U , in the second, it is  S U . The worker will choose the 
strategy that maximises his present value so that  { } S P U U U , max = . We will focus on equi-
libria in which the number of active MLTU jobseekers, S, is an interior solution to the model, 
while all newly unemployed workers prefer random search, such that  u S < < 0  and  I SI = , 
respectively. Thus, the MLTU workers are indifferent in the equilibrium between a placement 
via the PES or random search, so that  S P U U U = = . 
The value of a MLTU worker,  P U , who is waiting for a placement by the PES is given by 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) [] () U b T F P t dF t W W H F P U P
T
H P P P
P + − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + = + + ∫ ρ 1 .     (16) 
If the vacancy to which the worker is matched is not yet filled, the probability for this event 
is  + P , his value is  P W  provided that the hiring subsidy offsets the training costs, an event 
with probability  ) (H F . Otherwise, if the training costs are not fully refunded, the expected 
value of the worker is given by the integral expression in (16). If the training costs exceed  P T , 
firm and applicant separate, and the present value of the worker is  ) ( U b + ρ  as in the other 
two cases where the vacancy is already filled, or the worker is not offered a vacancy by the 
PES. These events, where the job search fails for one or the other reason, have the composite 
probability  () P T F P+ − 1 . 
If the MLTU worker decides for random search, he will incur search costs  0 > S c . Consid-
ering the probability of a suitable match  + p , his value  S U  is 
( ) () () ( ) [] P S
T
H S S S S U T F p t dF t W W H F p c U
S
+ + − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + − = ∫ 1
τ τ      (17)  
If the job search fails, either because the worker is confronted with a vacancy already filled 
or because he incurs training costs that exceed  S T  or because he does not meet a vacancy, a 
composite event with the probability  ( ) S T F p+ − 1 , his value is equal to  P U , because place-
ment via the PES concludes the search process. 
Wage negotiations. Each match generates a monopoly rent that is distributed between firm 
and worker through the wage. The distribution rules are obtained according to the generalised 
Nash solution to a bargaining problem, with  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ β  denoting the bargaining strength of the 
jobseeker. 
If a vacancy meets a STU worker, the outside wage  I w  is derived from the sharing rule  






.        (18) 
If the vacancy meets a MLTU worker, the sharing rule depends on whether the PES refunds 
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.     (20) 
Taking into account the idiosyncratic shock  [ ] 1 , R x∈ , the value of a STU worker  I U  and 
the fact that the asset price of a vacancy at the first stage of the search process is equal to zero, 
the sharing rule implemented by negotiations with an insider is 






.          ( 2 1 )   
Bargained wages. To determine the bargained wages we need to know the reservation 
wages of the different worker types which depend on the expected returns from random 
search, where  I J  and  S J  denote the expected returns of the STU and the MLTU jobseekers, 
respectively. Taking account of the expected search costs  I I p c  and  + p cS , and consider-
ing the fact that jobseekers can avoid active job search by waiting for a PES placement, we 




0 , 0 max .  
Considering the asset equations (6)–(9), (16) and the sharing rules (18)–(21), we obtain 
 
LEMMA 2 [BARGAINED WAGES]. (i)  The difference between the reservation wages of a 
MLTU worker who waits for a placement by the PES and an active STU worker depends on 
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,      (23) 
(iii)  The bargained inside wage at  [ ] 1 , R x∈  is  
() ( ) I I rU yx rU x w − + = β .          ( 2 4 )  
(iv)  The outside wages of the STU workers and the MLTU workers if the PES refunds the 
training costs are 
()
() ( ) ( )
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where  () 1 w  is the inside wage for  1 = x , and  r + = − 1 1 ρ .  
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,      (26) 
where the outside wages  P w  and  S w  are given by (25).  
  
Scar of unemployment. Newly employed workers suffer from a scar of unemployment. The 
outside options, which the employers can claim during the wage negotiations with a job-
seeker, and, in the case of a MLTU worker, the training costs are the reasons for the wage 
penalty which a jobseeker has to accept. Take for example the sharing rule (18) which shows, 
that the value of the outside option  I V  reduces the share of the current match rent a STU 
worker can appropriate in the wage negotiation. While  I V  refers to the beginning of the pe-
riod in the discrete-time model, wages are paid at the end. Therefore,  I V  is discounted in (25) 
to the end of the period.  
3.5 VALUE OF THE FILLED JOBS AND JOB DESTRUCTION 
With the wage equations from Lemma 2, the asset equations from Section 3.2, and the condi-
tion of the reservation productivity,  0 ) ( = R Π , we can now derive the value of the filled jobs. 
 
LEMMA 3 [FILLED JOBS]. (i)  The continuation value of a filled job producing with the 









β Π 1 .        (27) 
(ii)  The initial asset value of a job filled by a STU worker or a MLTU worker if the train-
ing costs are refunded by the PES is given by 
()
() ( ) ( )
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) (      (29) 
With the above equations for the filled jobs, we can derive the reservation costs  P T  and  S T , 
where we use the fact that in the equilibrium the MLTU workers are indifferent between the 
two methods of search, so that  P S U U = .  
  
LEMMA 4 [RESERVATION COSTS AND OUTSIDE OPTIONS]. (i)  The reservation costs  P T  
which are applied to the MLTU workers who are placed by the PES follow from (29) together 








.       (30) 
From the asset pricing equations (28)-(29), and  ( )+ = S S S T T Π P V Q H + − τ  we can derive 
the reservation costs for applicants who are active MLTU:  
( ) P P S V Q H T T + − − − = τ 1 .        (31) 
(ii)  From the above reservation costs and the asset equations of the outside options (11) 
and (12) we get the values of the outside options: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] P S
T
H S S S V Q T F t dF t T H T H F V
S
+ − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + − − = ∫ 1 1
τ τ τ β      (32) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + − − = ∫
P T
H P P P t dF t T H T H F V β 1 .     (33) 
There are two reasons for the fact that  0 > − S P T T  as equation (31) points out, first the hir-
ing subsidy and second the sequential matching process. However, H has a direct impact only 
in the subsidy regime  0 = τ , where only PES placements are supported. If all matches of 
MLTU workers are subsidized, then  1 = τ , and the subsidy has no direct impact on the reser-
vation cost differential  P S P V Q T T + = − .  
The job destruction condition can be derived given the wage equation (24) by evaluating the 
asset equation for a filled job (6) at the reservation threshold  R x = . We obtain 











.        ( 3 4 )  
Through the reservation wage of the insiders,  I rU , the odds in favour of finding a job 
through random search immediately after a separation and the annuity of the capital gain from 
active job search positively influence the reservation productivity R.  
Random search. Taking account of the sharing rules (18) and (19), the asset equation (28) 
for the initial value of a job filled with a STU worker,  I Π , and the equation (12) for the op-
tion value  S V , we can rewrite the gains from active job search for the STU and MLTU work-
ers as in Lemma 5.   
 
LEMMA 5 [RANDOM SEARCH]. (i)  The expected gain from active job search by the STU 
workers is given by: 
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Equilibrium. The equilibrium of the discrete-time search model consists of solutions 
[] H T T R S P S I , , , , , , θ θ Θ  to the model equations (A1) – (A7) in Appendix I. The comparative 
static effects of the subsidy budget, the subsidy regime and the productivity enhancing re-
forms of the PES are presented below through a series of numerical experiments with the pol-
icy variables [] ef B , ,τ . To evaluate the results, we introduce the following steady-state wel-
fare criterion. 
3.6 WELFARE 
The social planner takes the budget constraint (5), the distribution functions of the produc-
tivity shocks and the training costs as well as the matching functions of the two methods of 
search as given. The maximization problem of the planner has two state variables () Y u,  and 
seven control variables [] H T T R S P S I , , , , , , θ θ Θ , where Y is the average steady-state per-capita 
output of a job, which is available at the end of a period: 
() () [] () ( ) ( ) Y x yxdG u T F P S T F p u y S T F p y S yp
R P S S I I λ λ − − + − + + = ∫ + + +
1
1 0 . (35) 
During the initial period of a match,  I IS p  active STU workers and  () S T F p S +  active 
MLTU workers find a job and produce the output y. The unemployment pool  ( )S T F p u S + −  
consists of passive and active MLTU workers whose job search has failed. The fraction 
() P T F P+  of the pool is successfully placed by the PES and also produces the output y in the 
initial period of the match.  () u − 1 λ  of the continuing jobs are hit by a shock. The integral ex-
pression in equation (35) is the average output of the continuing jobs. In the steady-state the  
output of the start-ups and the jobs in the continuation periods must be equal to the average 
per-capita output which is lost in the case a shock arrives,  Y λ .  
To evaluate the simulation results, we use the following steady-state version of the plan-
ner’s discrete-time objective function subject to the budget constraint (5): 
() ( )











S V U S I I l
t tdF S T F p u T F P
t tdF S T F p u c ef u c ef S c S c u k u b Y
0
0 Θ Θ Ω
 (36) 
where Y is the steady-state output (35) and  u bl  is the utility of leisure of the unemployed. 
The next terms denote the recruiting costs of the v vacancies, where  u v Θ = , the search costs 
of the  I S  active STU, the S active MLTU and the PES, respectively; while the last two terms 
refer to the average training costs of, respectively, the MLTU workers who found a job 
through random search or via the PES. We take account of the production costs of the place-
ment service in a simple way, by weighting the unit costs  U c  and  V c  with the effort  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ ef  
the PES puts into job search. Increasing the effort will proportionally increase the effective 
unit costs.  
4 SIMULATION 
4.1 DATA, BASELINE PARAMETERS AND INDICATORS 
Data. The calibration targets are taken from the European employment data. In particular 
the unemployment rate u, the average unemployment duration D and the fraction of MLTU 
workers of the year 2006, MLTU, are used to calibrate the model. There exist no consistent 
time series of the fraction of active jobseekers and the performance of the European PESs 
which we could use for calibration. However, for the wage penalty associated with unem-
ployment and the instantaneous transition probability of the newly unemployed STU workers 
we can consult the descriptive statistics of Garcia-Perez and Sanz (2006, Table 3) and the 
estimation results of Forslund and Johansson (2007, Table 3), respectively. Although it is not 
necessary for our purpose to generate an exact mirror image of the EU employment statistics, 
the numerical simulation output of our model fits quite well with the data.  
For comparison, the unemployment rate, the fraction of MLTU workers and the average 
duration of an unemployment spell of the years 2001–2006 for Europe, the USA and the 
OECD are reported in Table 1. In 2006, our target values, the European unemployment rate 
and the average spell length, were 8.2 % and 15.7 months, respectively, while 77.1 % of the 
unemployed had an ongoing spell length of more than 3 months and belonged to the type of 
MLTU workers. 
Table 1: Data 2001 - 2006 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Europe  8.5 8.9 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.2 
u  (%)  USA 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 
  OECD  6.4 6.9 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.1 
  Europe  77.4 77.4 77.7 78.3 77.9 77.1 
MLTU  (%) USA  25.8 34.7 38.5 37.7 34.6 32.4 
  OECD 60.2 62.2 63.1 63.6 62.9 61.9 
  Europe  16.0 15.6 16.1 15.7 15.7 15.7 
D  (months)  USA 3.0 3.8 4.4 4.5 4.3 3.9 
  OECD  9.8 9.6 9.9 10.0  9.9 9.6 
Source: OECD (2008), Eurostat (2008). 
For the wage penalty, we follow Garcia-Perez and Sanz (2006, Table 3) who find a penalty 
of  3 . 14 = Pen  % with the German data from the eight waves (1994–2001) of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). The authors calculate the ratio of the wages at the time 
of the interview and prior to unemployment for men between 20 and 60 years of age and dis-
tinguish between stayers, voluntary movers, and involuntary movers. The benchmark of 
14.3 % is the wage penalty of the German involuntary movers. 
Although we choose the model period to be a quarter it is useful to consult Forslund and 
Johansson (2007, Table 3) for an estimation of the transition probability of the newly unem-
ployed workers. The authors evaluate a data set of the Swedish PES with records of all con-
tacts between jobseekers and the PES during the period 1991–2002 and estimate an instanta-
neous (weekly) transition probability of 21 %. 
Baseline parameters. We use the baseline parameters of Table 2. The marginal product of a 
job at full productivity is set to  100 = y ; the UI benefits,  60 = b , match the continental Euro-
pean replacement payments which vary between 40 % (Italy) and 90 % (Denmark) of the last 
net-income (OECD 2004). 
  
Table 2: Baseline parameters 
Parameters 
Output  y 100  Elasticity w.r.t. vacancies PES  Φ  0.30 
Unemployment benefit  b  60  Elasticity w.r.t. search effort of PES  κ 0.90 
Utility of leisure   l b   60  Total factor productivity RM  d 0.20 
Recruiting costs of a vacancy  k  38  Total factor productivity PES  a 0.20 
Search costs STU  cI  28.2  Real interest rate  r 0.01 
Search costs MLTU  cS 28.2  Probability of a shock  λ  0.10 
Search costs PES   U c   38  Lower support of G  α 0.532 
Search costs PES   V c   38  Mean training costs  1/δ  30 
Bargaining power  β  0.50  Duration of job search of a STU  j 1.5 
Elasticity w.r.t. vacancies SM  φ  0.30    
Policy instruments 
Hiring Subsidy  H  0  Effort of PES  ef 0.60 
 
Data on search and recruiting costs are not available and we set these parameters to obtain 
the target values. The recruiting costs of a vacancy are  38 = k ; the search costs of the active 
STU and the active MLTU workers are  2 . 28 = = S I c c . In the policy-free equilibrium, all 
newly unemployed STU workers choose the active search strategy, such that  I SI = , and earn 
the capital gain from active job search  6 . 55 = I J  (see Figure 2). With increasing search costs 
I c ,  I J  decreases monotonically and approaches zero for  725 . 51 = I c . Recall, that at  0 = I J  
STU workers are indifferent between the active and the passive search strategy with the con-
sequence that the hiring subsidy would induce an increasing fraction of passive jobseekers 
among the STU workers. With search costs of  2 . 28 = S c , the fraction of active jobseekers 
among the MLTU workers in the policy-free environment is equal to  9 . 50 = S σ  % (see Fig-
ure 2). If  S c  would fall ceteris paribus by 5 % to  79 . 26 = S c , the equilibrium fraction of ac-
tive MLTU workers would rise by 41.3 % to  8 . 71 = S σ  %. Roughly one half of the European 
unemployed are LTU workers and, presumably, do not actively search for a job, therefore the 
equilibrium fraction of 50.9 % active MLTU workers seems to be not too low. 
For the effort of the public placement service, we set  60 . 0 = ef . To calculate the aggregate 
per capita welfare we additionally assume that the PES has to bear effective search costs of 
8 . 22 = U c ef  per registered unemployed and the same unit costs per registered vacancy. The 
utility of leisure of an unemployed worker is assumed to be  60 = l b . 
We follow Mortensen and Pissarides (MP 1999, 2003) and make the following additional 
assumptions. The bargaining power of the workers is  50 . 0 = β ; the matching functions of the 
PES and the method of random search (RS) are of the Cobb Douglas type (Petrongolo and  
Pissarides 2001). For a given vacancy the probability for a contact arranged by the PES is 
() = Θ , ef Q ()
Φ κ Θ
− ∗ ∗
1 1 ef a  and for a contact via RS it is  ( ) ()
φ θ θ
− ∗ =
1 1 d q . For the va-
cancy elasticities we assume  = φ 30 . 0 = Φ .
3 The effort of the PES exhibits diminishing re-
turns since the effort elasticity is  90 . 0 = κ . From this it follows that the production function 
of the PES has increasing returns to scale. The values of the total factor productivities are 
= a 20 . 0 = d . 
The real interest rate r is 1 % per quarter; the probability of a productivity shock λ is 10 %; 
the shock distribution  () x G  is uniform on [ ] 1 , α , with the lower support  532 . 0 = α ; training 
costs are exponentially distributed with mean  30 1 = δ ; the mean duration of unemployment 
of the STU workers who immediately after separation find a new job is equal to 1.5 months.  
Indicators. In order to evaluate the simulation output we use the indicators in Table 3. The 
defining equations for the fraction of MLTU workers, MLTU, the average wage penalty, Pen, 
and the placement rate of the PES, PES, are reported in Appendix II. 
Table 3: Indicators 
u*100  Unemployment rate in per cent, see Lemma 1; 
G λ *100  Unemployment incidence in per cent; 
I J   Gain from active job search by the STU, see Lemma 5; 
100 ∗ = u S S σ   Fraction of active jobseekers among the MLTU, see Lemma 1; 
MLTU   Fraction of the MLTU; 
D,  I D ,  S d ,  P d  (months)  Unemployment duration, see Lemma 1; 
Pen   Average wage penalty an applicant must accept; 
PES  Placement rate of the PES; 
Ω   Social welfare, see equation (36). 
 
Target achievement. Table 4 represents the values of the calibration targets in the first col-
umn and the calibration point for a policy-free environment in the second column. We have 
chosen the calibration point such that the unemployment rate and the average duration of un-





                                                 
3   Thus, the Hosios condition is not fulfilled (Hosios 1990).  
Table 4: Matching the targets 
Target  EU Employment Data  Model 
Unemployment rate  u  8.2 %  8.0 % 
Average duration of unemployment  D  15.7 (months)  14.8 (months) 
Incidence of MLTU workers  MLTU  77.1 %  83.7 % 
Wage penalty  Pen  14.3 % 
1 16.6  % 
Transition rate STU workers   I p   21 % (week)
 2 34.3  %  (quarter) 
1: Garcia-Perez and Sanz (2006, Table 3); 2: Forslund and Johansson (2007, Table 3) 
We find  7 . 83 = MLTU  %, which is high relative to the data ( 1 . 77 = MLTU  %). One rea-
son for the difference is the discrete time structure of the model. A second more important 
reason are the low vacancy elasticities. Low vacancy elasticities are in line with the recent 
empirical research (Sunde 2007, Broersma and van Ours 1999) but have, of course, the effect 
of increasing the fraction of MLTU workers. For example, with  3813 . 0 = =Φ φ  the fraction 
of MLTU workers would match ceteris paribus the target value. 
Also the wage penalty seems to be high compared with the finding of Garcia-Perez and 
Sanz (2006). But again, the empirical values are influenced by the European ALMP, which 
reduces the average penalty. Second, we relate the average initial wage to the average insider 
wage, which is presumably too high as a reference wage since it excludes negative selection 
effects which are important for the empirical measures of the wage penalty. Garcia-Perez and 
Sanz (2006) divide for example the wages of the respondents of the ECHP after their unem-
ployment spell by the wages the respondents earned prior to the spell. But the average wage 
earned by the respondents prior to unemployment is presumably lower than the average in-
sider wage (Jacobsen et al. 1993).  
4.2 HIRING SUBSIDY 
The results of the experiments with the subsidy budget B are reported in Figure 2. The hori-
zontal axes of the diagrams represent the budget B, the vertical axes measure the outcome 
variables. The solid curves illustrate the results for the regime  0 = τ , where only PES place-
ments receive subsidy payments, and the dashed curves show the corresponding results for the 
subsidy regime  1 = τ . The endogenous subsidy limit per eligible job H is depicted on the ver-
tical axis of the first diagram. The second diagram portrays the unemployment curves and the 
third depicts the overall welfare induced by B in the respective subsidy regime.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
MP model the hiring subsidy as a lump-sum payment that offsets the fixed job creation 
costs of the employers. Creation is stimulated and the labour market tightness as well as the 
opportunity costs of the filled jobs rise. Subsidizing job creation has therefore two opposing 
effects in the MP model with random search: (i) a decrease in unemployment duration and (ii) 
an increase of job destruction and unemployment incidence. The net effect of the subsidy is 
ambiguous (Pissarides 2000). In the numerical experiments, which the authors conduct in MP 
(1999, 2003), the second effect outweighs the first, so that the subsidy decreases employment. 
Contrary to MP, in the present model jobseekers have two matching technologies available, 
random search and the PES. Thus, they can choose between an active and a passive search 
strategy via the PES. The hiring subsidy reduces the private gain from active job search,  I J , 
as the diagram in the right lower corner of Figure 2 shows and creates strong incentives to 
switch from random to organised search. These institutional and technological differences 
have consequences in particular for the above simulation result (i) by MP. 
 
Result 1. In the policy regime  0 = τ , where only PES placements are subsidised, the hiring 
subsidy amplifies job destruction and extends contrary to the MP model the aggregate dura-
tion of unemployment, such that the steady state unemployment increases. 
 
For convenience Table 5 summarizes the effects of the hiring subsidy on the outcome vari-
ables. Figure 2 shows consistent with the MP model that the unemployment effect of the sub-
sidy budget B is positive. In regime  0 = τ ,  u increases from 8.0  % ( 0 = B ) to 10.2  % 
( 25 = B ) which can be explained as follows. 
Table 5:  Effects of the Hiring Subsidy 
  () R G λ   D MLTU  I p   P d   S d   S σ   u 
MP (1999, 2003)  ↑   ↓         ↑  
          
Subsidy-Regime:          
0 = τ   ↑   ↑   ↑   ↑   ↑   ↓   ↓   ↑  
1 = τ   ↑   ↓   ↓   ↓   ↓   ↑   ↑   ↑  
First, the subsidy offsets the training costs of the firms which fill their vacancies with job-
seekers placed by the PES up to the subsidy limit H. The subsidy therefore lowers the ex-
pected hiring costs and job creation is stimulated. Tightness in the two labour market seg- 
ments with random search rise together with the opportunity costs of the filled jobs. Hence, 
firms and workers separate faster and job destruction increases from 2.8 % to 3.0 %.  
Second, in the regime  0 = τ  firms and MLTU workers can only pocket the subsidy if they 
are matched by the PES. Therefore the subsidy increases the opportunity costs of a start-up in 
the first and second stage of the matching process, so that the fraction of active job-seekers 
among the MLTU,  S σ , falls, while the fraction of MLTU workers increases.  
Third, the hiring subsidy reduces the duration of a job search of an active MLTU worker 
S d , while the duration of a passive job search  P d  increases from 28.3 to 29.4 months. These 
effects are attributable to the growing number of passive jobseekers who are concentrated in 
the third stage of the matching process. As a result the tightness between the registers of the 
PES declines, the response time of the PES given its search effort ef rises and the probability 
of a suitable match arranged by the PES falls. Nevertheless, the increasing response time is 
favourable for the matches arranged by the PES, as the strictly increasing and strictly convex 
subsidy curve in the first diagram of Figure 2 indicates. It is not surprising that in the regime 
0 = τ  the duration of the unemployment spell of the active jobseekers among the MLTU 
workers falls because, on the one hand, the supply of vacancies is stimulated and, on the other 
hand, the number of active job-seekers falls. 
Aggregating the various duration effects according to equation (4), we find that contrary to 
the MP model due to the crowding-out of the active jobseekers and the increasing duration of 
a job search via the PES the overall duration of unemployment D increases from 14.8 to 17.6 
months. 
 
Result 2.  In the regime  1 = τ , where all matches with MLTU workers are subsidized, the 
duration effect of the hiring subsidy is negative, while unemployment is modestly rising. Nev-
ertheless, the subsidy reduces welfare, though to a lesser degree than in the subsidy regime 
0 = τ . 
 
Indeed, the subsidy raises the fraction of active job-seekers among the MLTU workers in 
the regime  1 = τ  from 50.9 % to 57.3 %. But the symmetrical labour market policy neverthe-
less lowers overall employment, though to a much smaller degree than in the regime  0 = τ . 
The policy outcome can be explained as follows.  
First, the creation effect is much stronger in the subsidy regime  1 = τ  than in the regime 
0 = τ , as the comparison of the two H-curves in the first diagram of Figure 2 shows. The sub-
sidy limit per eligible job H is for given B more than halved with the transition from regime 
0 = τ  to  1 = τ . Hence, job destruction is slightly accelerated and unemployment incidence 
reinforced, so much that the labour market tightness during the first stage of the search proc-
ess and the transition rate of the STU workers decline. Start-ups under  1 = τ  can pocket the 
subsidy not only in the third but also in the second stage of the matching process. As a result, 
the number and the fraction of active MLTU workers strongly increase, so much that also the 
labour market tightness during the second stage of the matching process declines and the tran-
sition rate of the active MLTU workers decreases too. 
Second, although the transition rates of the active jobseekers who use random search de-
crease the outflows from both search market segments into employment increase with B, 
while both outflows are decreasing in the regime  0 = τ . 
Third, the relatively strong creation effect and the weak unemployment effect of B lead to 
an increasing tightness between the PES registers of vacancies and unemployed and thus to a 
growing transition rate for the PES placements. 
Finally, contrary to the regime  0 = τ , B reduces the aggregate duration of unemployment 
from 14.8 to 14.0 months. This duration effect is due to the increasing fraction of active job-
seekers among the MLTU workers and the declining duration of a job search via the PES. The 
fraction of MLTU workers is lower than in regime  0 = τ  and slightly decreasing in B. But the 
symmetric labour market policy leads to a growing concentration of MLTU workers in the 
second stage of the search process and thus to an increasing duration of random search,  S d .  
To sum up, four factors are responsible for the fact that the unemployment rate in the re-
gime  1 = τ  rises more slowly if B increases than in the regime  0 = τ : the stronger creation 
effect of B, the increasing fraction of active jobseekers among the MLTU workers compared 
to the crowding-out of active job search in the regime  0 = τ , the increasing transition rate of 
the workers placed by the PES and the falling duration of unemployment.  
 
Result 3.  In the MP model, where all start-ups are eligible, STU workers who find a job 
would obtain a wage advantage compared to the average insider wage. In the present model, 
successful STU workers suffer from a wage penalty, IPen, which is strictly increasing in B. In  
contrast, the average wage penalty of an entrant, Pen, is strictly decreasing in both subsidy 
regimes.  
 
The scar of unemployment Pen, which an entrant must accept, is the weighted average of 
the penalties of the STU workers, IPen, the active MLTU workers, SPen, and the workers, 
who are placed by the PES, PPen, see Appendix II. All wage penalties are reported in Table 6 
for the subsidy regimes  0 = τ  and  1 = τ . 
Table 6:  Wage Penalties (%) 
IPen SPen PPen Pen  B 
0 = τ   1 = τ   0 = τ   1 = τ   0 = τ   1 = τ   0 = τ   1 = τ  
0  8.5  8.5  25.7 25.7 15.9 15.9 16.6 16.6 
5  8.6  8.6  26.4 23.4 12.0 13.7 15.1 15.3 
10  8.8  8.6 27.0  21.2 8.5 11.6  13.4  14.0 
15  8.9  8.7 27.5  19.1 5.2  9.6 11.7  12.7 
20  9.0  8.8 28.0  17.0 2.3  7.6 10.1  11.5 
25  9.1 8.9  28.3  14.9  5 . 0 −  5.7  8.4  10.3 
In the MP model, in which all start-ups receive a lump-sum subsidy payment, three factors 
are responsible for the wage advantage of the entrants; first, the idiosyncratic productivity 
component of a new match which takes on its maximal value with  1 = x ; second, the alloca-
tion of the hiring subsidy which is subject of the wage bargaining; and third, the fact that there 
is a single matching method in the MP model only. The value of the outside option of a va-
cancy is, therefore, independent from the hiring subsidy equal to zero given the free entry and 
the free disposal assumption of the MP model. 
The positive impact of the hiring subsidy on the wage penalty of the STU workers in the 
present model can be explained as follows. First, start-ups which are filled with a STU worker 
do not receive subsidies. Second, recall the sharing rule (18) which shows the dependence of 
the surplus of a match with a STU worker on the employer’s outside option  I V . The outside 
option is a consequence of the competing matching methods of random and organised job 
search. Now,  0 > IPen  follows from  0 > I V , and the increase of IPen is induced by the fact 
that  I V  is strictly increasing in H. 
The wage penalty of the MLTU workers is dependent on the hiring subsidy and the policy 
regime. The active MLTU workers experience the penalty SPen. In the regime  0 = τ ,  SPen , 
which in this case reflects the uncompensated training costs, is strictly increasing, while in the 
regime  1 = τ  the penalty falls. The difference between the penalties of the two types of  
MLTU workers, SPen and PPen, is attributable to the value of the outside option which the 
employers are able to claim during the wage negotiation with a MLTU worker who randomly 
searched for the job.  
Why is PPen, the penalty experienced by the PES placements, lower in the regime  0 = τ  
than in the regime  1 = τ ? PPen can even turn into a wage advantage if the budget B is suffi-
ciently high, as for example in the case  25 = B , where  5 . 0 − = PPen . After all, in the regime 
1 = τ  the creation effect of B is stronger, the equilibrium unemployment is lower and is in-
creasing more slowly than in the regime  0 = τ . In addition, the tightness between the registers 
of the vacancies and the unemployed and thus the transition rate for workers, who are placed 
by the PES, is increasing in B. Ceteris paribus these effects should be sufficient for a lower 
PPen in the regime  1 = τ . However, in  1 = τ  only somewhat more than half of the budget B is 
allocated to the PES placements, while in  0 = τ  these placements enjoy all of B. The second 
effect outweighs the first, so that PPen is higher in the regime  1 = τ .  
Finally, the decline of the average wage penalty, Pen, which is stronger in the regime  0 = τ  
than in  1 = τ , can be attributed to two factors. First the diminishing search incentives, which 
reduce the fraction of active jobseekers and increase the number of MLTU workers, and sec-
ond to the falling wage penalty of the passive workers who wait for a placement by the PES. 
4.3 PES PERFORMANCE AND PROFILING 
PESs are built on the conviction that the unfettered labour market fails. Equilibrium unem-
ployment is too high, the duration of an unemployment spell is too long, the quality of the 
matches is too low, the life span of a job is too short or the private replacement payments are 
too volatile or nonexistent at all, these are some of the judgements about labour market fail-
ures. Labour law, labour courts, unions and further central help agencies beside the PES shall 
prevent the market failures or support and compensate the victims. Result 4 reports perform-
ance measures for the PES. Result 5 illustrates the impact of organizational reforms which 
serve to enhance the placement effectivity of the PES.  
The performance measures VPES, EPES and PES, see Table 7 and Figure 2, are taken from 
OECD (1992). VPES gauges the placements of the PES as a percentage of the notified vacan-
cies, while EPES is the number of PES placements as a percentage of the filled jobs. PES, see  
Appendix II, measures the PES placements as a percentage of all hirings and is used by gov-
ernments and empirical research, in order to quantify the achievements of the PES (OECD 
2006). Finally, one could argue that the PES is a safety net for jobseekers. Therefore we pre-
sent the indicator SPES which measures the number of active MLTU workers who failed to 
find a job by random search and are placed by the PES as a percentage of all active MLTU. 
 
Result 4.  With the exception of SPES the performance measures are all increasing in the 
subsidy budget B in the regime  0 = τ . Due to the mobilization of the private job search of the 
MLTU workers, the placement volume EPES is nearly constant, while VPES and PES are 
strictly decreasing and SPES is strictly increasing in the regime  1 = τ . 
Table 7:  PES Performance (%) 
VPES EPES SPES PES  B 
0 = τ   1 = τ   0 = τ   1 = τ   0 = τ   1 = τ   0 = τ   1 = τ  
0  9.0 9.0  0.81  0.81  8.1 8.1  34.4 34.4 
5  9.5 8.9  0.87  0.81  8.0 8.2  36.7 33.9 
10  10.1 8.7 0.93  0.82 7.9 8.2  38.7 33.5 
15  10.5 8.6 0.98  0.82 7.8 8.2  40.5 33.1 
20  10.9 8.5 1.03  0.82 7.7 8.2  42.1 32.7 
25  11.3 8.4 1.07  0.82 7.6 8.3  43.6 32.3 
That PES, the number of PES placements as a percentage of all hirings, is strictly increas-
ing in regime  0 = τ , is due to the subsidy induced weakening of the search incentives and the 
following reallocation of the jobseekers from random to organised job search.  
Advancing the PES search effort seems to be an effective policy goal, since both the con-
tact rate of the jobseekers as well as the vacancies are strictly increasing functions of ef. Client 
opinion polls confirm that workers and firms welcome reforms, which make the PES more 
effective, and express their satisfaction with the achievements of the reorganized agencies 
(BA Geschäftsberichte 2006, 2007). IT improvement, development of the human resources 
for placement, counselling, profiling, screening and training measures are, therefore, much-
recommended policy strategies to increase the effectivity of the PES (OECD 2006). To inves-
tigate the macroeconomic effects of such productivity enhancement strategies we conduct a 
numerical experiment with the search effort ef of the PES and calculate the comparative static 
impact on the outcome variables of the model. Figure 3 represents the results. 
[Figure 3 about here]  
Result 5. The more effort the PES puts into the job search, the higher the equilibrium un-
employment is. Equilibrium unemployment increases from 6.3 % to 14.1 % when the search 
effort of the PES rises from  55 . 0 = ef  to  00 . 1 = ef . 
Nevertheless, IT improvement, profiling and activation strategies are a great success for 
the PES and its target group. The placement rate PES increases from 24.4 % to 74.6 %, see 
Table 8 and Figure 3, while  P d , the duration of a job search of a MLTU worker via the PES, 
decreases from 29.0 to 19.1 months, and  S d , the duration of an active job search of a MLTU 
worker, falls from 10.1 to 5.5 months. 
Table 8:  PES Performance (%) 
ef  VPES EPES SPES  PES 
0.55  6.2 0.57 8.1 24.4 
0.60  9.0 0.81 8.1 34.4 
0.70  14.5  1.35 8.3 52.3 
0.80  19.0  1.83 8.6 63.8 
0.90  22.5  2.22 8.7 70.6 
1.00  25.5  2.55 8.5 74.6 
Contrary to the conventional opinion (OECD 2006) our model therefore suggests the hy-
pothesis, that the mounting European unemployment during the past decades can be attributed 
to the interferences of the PESs into the European job markets. The establishment and growth 
of the European PESs fundamentally changed the weight of random and organised job search.  
The reasons for the rising unemployment are threefold. First, the more effective PES raises 
the opportunity costs of the occupied jobs and hence the incidence of unemployment, as is 
shown in the diagram in the upper right corner of Figure 3. Second, the opportunity costs of 
the active search strategy increase too, so that the equilibrium composition of search strategies 
shifts from active to passive job search. The fraction of active MLTU workers  S σ  for exam-
ple drops from 83.7 % to 3.1 % while on the other hand the fraction of MLTU workers in-
creases from 78.1 % to 88.6 %. Third, the aggregate duration of unemployment D, which is 
given by equation (4), is hump-shaped. D increases from 11.2 to 17.1 months where it attains 
a maximum at an effort level of  70 . 0 = ef . For higher effort levels, the duration decreases 
again until it reaches a boundary value at 15.1 months. The hump-shaped curvature of the du-
ration curve, see Figure 3, is the result of the following factors. On the one hand the durations 
of a job search for all types of search strategies decline and reduce ceteris paribus the overall 
duration D. The fact that  P d  falls from 29.0 to 19.1 months is obviously due to the organiza-
tional reforms, which increase the search effort of the PES. The decline of  I D  from 8.8 to 5.9 
months and of  S d  from 10.1 to 5.5 months result from the crowding-out of the active job- 
seekers. This improves the chances of the remaining workers who stick to their strategy. On 
the other hand, the fraction of active MLTU workers,  S σ , is not only strictly decreasing in ef, 
what overcompensates at first the impact of the sinking strategy-specific durations on D. But 
the  S σ -curve is strictly convex, such that the reallocation effect of the PES effort diminishes 
with an increasing ef.  
That the per capita welfare Ω is decreasing, see Figure 3, is a consequence first of the de-
creasing employment, which reduces the per capita production Y. Second, private search costs 
are reduced, but on the other hand public search costs are increasing as the number of passive 
jobseekers rises and the effort of the PES is intensified. 
To sum up, organizational reforms which intensify the search effort of the PES increase the 
job destruction rate and sharply decrease the fraction of active MLTU workers, so that the 
policy will lead to a higher rate of unemployment while the unobservable social welfare de-
clines. On the other hand, the reforms are a visible success for the PES, all four performance 
measures will increase and the length of a passive job search of the MLTU workers, who rely 
on the search assistance of the PES, will strongly decline. 
5 SUMMARY 
The innovation of our model is that apart from the endogenous job destruction rate the equilib-
rium rate of unemployment reflects, first, the composition of the two matching methods, ran-
dom search and organised search by the PES, second, the duration of a job search with the ac-
tive and the passive search strategy, and third, the search behaviour of the public placement ser-
vice. The type-specific durations of unemployment depend on the effort the PES puts into the 
placement activities, the subsidy regime and the distribution of the match-specific training costs, 
which a firm employing a medium-term or long-term unemployed (MLTU) worker must spend 
to train the entrant. The subsidy regime determines whether only PES placements are eligible or 
all matches with a MLTU worker are entitled to compete for the payments from the subsidy 
budget. 
The effects of the hiring subsidy depend on the target group. For short-term unemployed 
(STU), who are indirectly affected, the hiring subsidy is always counterproductive and re- 
duces the incentives to search actively for a job. For eligible MLTU workers, the subsidy has 
a stimulating effect on job creation. If both active and passive MLTU are supported, the sub-
sidy can even reduce the fraction of MLTU workers. Nevertheless, the subsidy increases un-
employment. The higher unemployment is attributable to the rising job destruction, the de-
clining fraction of active jobseekers, and, contrary to the Mortensen-Pissarides model, the 
increasing aggregate duration of a job search. 
Certainly, the PES can advance its placement success by improving the effort of its place-
ment agencies through IT innovations, development of the human resources for placement, 
counselling, profiling, screening and training measures. But effectivity enhancement pro-
grammes will heighten the opportunity costs, first of the filled jobs and second of active job 
search. Job destruction will rise and the fraction of active jobseekers will sharply decline so 
that the organizational reforms will finally lead to higher equilibrium unemployment.  
The economic policy consequences of the model are clear: the effects of a hiring subsidy 
and PES reforms depend on the target group. For the short-term unemployed not only indirect 
effects of the hiring subsidy but also of the job placement activities of the PES are counter-
productive. On the other hand, these instruments have a stimulating effect on job creation for 
target groups who in the equilibrium without policy have no incentive to actively search for a 
job. But policy makers have to take into account that the two instruments of active labour 
market policy reduce aggregate employment. 
Our model does not confirm the maintained welfare effects of a centralized labour market 
agency. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the simulations suggest the hypotheses that in-
creasing the effectiveness of the PES through counselling, profiling, screening and training 
measures will induce a change of the weight of the active and the passive search strategies, so 
that equilibrium unemployment increases and social welfare declines. 
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Figure 2:  Hiring Subsidy Budget B  
 











0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ef









0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ef






0 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 80 . 91 . 0
ef
λG











0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ef








0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ef






0 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 80 . 91 . 0
ef








0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ef








0 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 80 . 91 . 0
ef









0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ef
D








0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0
ef








0 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 80 . 91 . 0
ef






0 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 80 . 91 . 0
ef
 
Figure 3:  Search Effectivity of the PES ef  
APPENDIX I: MODEL EQUATIONS 
The model has seven endogenous variables [ ] H T T R S P S I , , , , , , θ θ Θ  and three policy pa-
rameters [] ef B , ,τ . Table 9 shows the model equations in implicit form, where we make use 
of the following abbreviations:  = + P ( )( ) S I q q P − − 1 1,   () I S q p p − = + 1,   = + Q  
() [] u S T F p Q S + − 1 , and  = ⋅) ( i J () τ θ θ Θ , , ; , , , , , , ef B H T T R J S P S I
i , 7 , , 1K = i . 
 
Tab. 9: Model equations in implicit form 
from equation  No. 
(28)  () () ( ) ( ) 0 1 1
1 = − − − − ≡ ⋅ I P P U U J β Π Π   (A1)
(31)  () ( ) 0 1 2 = − − − − ≡ ⋅ + P S P V Q H T T J τ   (A2)
(34)  () () ( ) 0
1 3 = −
+
+ − ≡ ⋅ ∫R







(JC)  () () ( ) [] I I I V q q k J β Π − − + + − ≡ ⋅ 1 1 1
4   (A4)
Lem. 
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(5)  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) [] () ( ) () () [] ⎥ ⎦
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⎡ − + + ⎥ ⎦
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APPENDIX II: INDICATORS 
We measure the faction of MLTU workers by dividing the number of unemployed with an 
ongoing spell length strictly larger than a quarter by the sum of the unemployed u and the 





− =1 .           
For the average wage penalty an unemployed worker must accept, Pen, we use the 
weighted mean of the initial wages of the STU workers as well as the active and passive 
MLTU workers and divide by the average inside wage: 
() ( ) [ ]
w
w w p w p
Pen S S P S I I I σ σ + − − +
− =
1 1
1 ,        
where  I w  is the initial wage of the STU workers, and  P w ,  S w  and w  are, respectively, the 
average initial wages of the MLTU workers who found a job through the PES or via random 
search and the average inside wage, for which (see Lemma 2): 
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The placement rate of the PES is measured as the number of matches arranged by the PES 
as a percentage of the total number of matches per period: 
( ) ( ) [ ]
() () [] () I I S S P
S P
S p S T F p S T F p u T F P
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APPENDIX III: PROOFS 
Proof of Lemma 1. Ad (i): Since the PES arranges contacts with probability P,  P / 1 1+  pe-
riods elapse in the steady state between the first day of the unemployment spell and the first 
job contact. () () S I q q − − 1 1  is the probability that the vacancy found is neither filled with an 
active STU nor with an active MLTU. So the average duration of data processing and search 
for an unfilled vacancy amounts to  + + P / 1 1  periods. If vacancy and applicant meet, they ob-
serve the training costs  0 ≥ t . If  P T t ≤ , the applicant is accepted, an event with probability 
) ( P T F . Hence the average length of time required for a successful job search via the PES is 
equal to  P D . Ad (ii): The reasoning is similar as with (i). Ad (iii): A STU worker, who opts 
for the active search strategy, meets a vacancy with probability  I p . The duration of job 
search is equal to half a period. With probability  I p − 1  the search fails and the worker be-
comes active MLTU, with a duration of unemployment equal to  S d . Therefore the duration of 
unemployment of an active jobseeker is:  ( ) S I I I D p p D − + = 1 5 . 0 . Ad (iv): Inserting equa-
tion (1) into equation (2), using  ( )( ) u R G I − = 1 λ  and taking into account  u S I I σ = ,  u S S σ =  
and  () P P d T F P / 1 = +  we get 
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d
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− + = − − + +
1 1
1 1
,      
from which the equilibrium unemployment (3) follows. Ad (v):  I p  is the probability of an 
immediate transition with a duration of unemployment of a half period. With probability 
I p − 1  the job search fails and the worker becomes MLTU. Being MLTU the worker will 
randomly search with probability  S σ  and face a spell length of  S d  periods. With probability 
S σ − 1  the worker decides to wait for a placement via the PES and his expected unemploy-
ment duration is equal to  P d . The expected duration of unemployment conditional on becom-
ing MLTU is therefore determined by  ( ) = + − + S S P S d d σ σ 1 1 ( ) S S P S D D σ σ + − 1.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2. Ad (i) Write the sharing rule (18) as  () I I I I V U W − + = − Π β
β
1  and use 
the resulting equation to substitute  I W  out of (15). In view of  P U U =  it follows  
() ( ) ( ) P I I I I I I I I U b p V p U p c U + − + − + + − = − ρ Π β




− + + − = ρ I p
p
I P I J b U U rU
I
I . The equation of the reservation wage  I rU  includes the 
case where  I S  is an interior solution to the model and  0 = I J . Next we derive the reservation 
wage of the MLTU workers who are placed by the PES. Rearrange the asset equation (16): 
() [] = − +
−
P P T F P U 1
1 ρ () ( ) ( ) [] () + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + − ∫ +
− P T
H P P P P t dF U t W U W H F P 1 ρ  
() [] () P P U b T F P + − + 1 . Divide by  ( ) [] P T F P+ − 1  and rearrange terms to get the reservation 





+ + = ρ β
β
P T F P
P
P V b rU
P
. Now the equations (22) and (23) of the lemma follow 
from the above equations of the reservation wages  I rU  and  P rU . Ad (ii) Write the sharing 
rule (21) as 
() ( ) ( ) x x W UI Π β β β − − = − ) 1 ( 1 .         ( B 1 )  
Substitute  () x Π  and  () x W  with the asset equations (6) and (7) out of (B1) and the inside-
wage (24) follows. Ad (iii)  I i = : Write the sharing rule (18) as 
() I I I I W V U Π β β β β − − = − − ) 1 ( 1 .      (B2) 
Now for  I i =  the outside-wage (25) follows from (B2), the asset pricing equations 
() () ( ) ( ) { } 1 1
1
Π λ Π λ ρ Π − + + − = ∫R I I h dG h w y      ( B 3 )  






⎧ − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + = ∫ 1 1
1
W U R G h dG h W w W I R I I λ λ ρ        (B4) 
and the equation for the inside wage (24) together with (B1). Ad (iii) and (iv)  P i = : Write 
the sharing rule (20) as () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t W H t U P P P Π β β β β − − = − − − 1 1 . Substitute the values of 
the filled job and the employed worker with (8) and (9) out of the above equation, and take 
into account (B1) and the equation for the inside wage (24) to get the wage equation  ( )= t wP  
() ( ) ( ) 1 1 ) ( 1 1 − − − − − − + ρ β ρ β H t U U w I P . The wage (25) for  P i =  follows, if one takes into 
account that the last term on the RHS of the above wage equation is equal to zero if  H t ≤ . 
The proof for  S i =  is similar, where we use asset pricing equations for  () t S Π  and  ( ) t WS , 
which correspond to (8) and (9), (B1) and the sharing rule (19), which we can rewrite as 
() ( ) () ( ) t t W V Q H t U S S P S Π β β β ι β β − − = − − − − + ) ( 1 1.   
 
Proof of Lemma 3. Ad (i): Equation (6) and  0 ) ( = R Π  imply  ( )+ − = R w yR 0  
() () ∫
1
R h dG h Π λ  and ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∫ + − = +
1
R h dG h x w yx x r Π λ Π λ . From these two equations 
together with the wage equation (24) the statement follows. Ad (ii) and (iii): For  I i =  insert 
the wage equation (25) into the asset equation (B3) and take account of equation (6) to derive 
the asset equation (28). For  P i =  the asset equations (28) and (29) follow from substituting 
the wage equation (25) and (24) into (8) and (9) respectively. Then rearrange terms and take 
account of the asset equation (6). For  S i =  we can derive (28) and (29) from the correspond-
ing asset equation for  S Π  and (8) by taking into account the wage equations (25) and (24). 
 
Proof of Lemma 4. Ad (i): For  P i =  write the asset equation (29) as  () = − + P P P T H T Π  
() ( ) H TP P − − − β Π 1 , and take account of the reservation cost condition,  () − + H TP P Π  
0 = P T . For  S i =  equations (29) and (28) imply  ( ) [ ] P S P S S V Q H T T + + − + = τ β Π Π . Tak-
ing account of the definition of the reservation cost it follows that  () ( ) β Π Π − = 1 / P S S T , 
hence  () ( ) P S P P V Q H T + + − + = − τ β Π β Π 1 / . From the last equation we get 
() P S P V Q H T + + − = − τ β Π 1 / , so that in view of (30) the proposition follows. 